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Description
The era known as Reconstruction is one of the unhappiest times in American history. It succeeded in
reuniting the nation politically after the Civil War but in little else. Conflict shifted from the battlefield to the
Capitol as Congress warred with President Andrew Johnson over just what to do with the South. Johnson's
plan of Presidential Reconstruction, which was sympathetic to the former Confederacy and allowed repressive
measures such as the "black codes," would ultimately lead to his impeachment and the institution of Radical
Reconstruction. While Reconstruction saw the ratification of the 14th and 15th Amendments, expanding the
rights and suffrage of African Americans, it largely failed to chart a progressive course for race relations after
the abolition of slavery and the rise of Jim Crow. It also struggled to manage the Southern resistance towards a
Northern free-labor economy. However, these failures cannot obscure a number of accomplishments with
long-term consequences for American life, among them the Civil Rights Act, the election of the first African
American representatives to Congress, and the avoidance of renewed civil war. Reconstruction suffered from
poor leadership and uncertainty of direction, but it also laid the groundwork for renewed struggles for racial
equality during the civil rights movement.
In this concise history, award-winning historian Allen C. Guelzo delves into the constitutional, political, and
social issues behind Reconstruction to provide a lucid and original account of a historical moment that left an
indelible mark on the American social fabric.
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Introduction
Ihe era in US history known as Reconstruction forms a sort of 
coda to the traumatic years of the American Civil War, which lasted 
from 1861 to 1865. It embraces the twelve years of active effort to 
rebuild and reconstitute the American Union after the attempt by 
the Confederate States of America to secede from it, and in some 
sense (because it had no official starting or ending date) it spluttered 
on well into the 1890s.
But Reconstruction can also reasonably be characterized as 
the ugly duckling of American history. The twelve years that are 
the conventional designation of the Reconstruction period, from 
1865 to 1877, teem with associations and developments that seem 
regrettable, if not simply baleful. They left a long legacy of bitter­
ness, especially among Southerners who believed that they had 
fought an honorable war and were handed a dishonorable peace, 
as well as Southerners who refused to accept defeat and manufac­
tured the myth of a glorious "Lost Cause” to justify themselves and 
their continuing belief in the rightness of the Confederate project. 
Reconstruction also coincided with an eruption of notorious levels 
of graft, corruption, and fraud in American civil governments—not 
least in the ones erected by federal force in the former rebel states. 
But Reconstruction is probably best known, and least liked, as the 
greatest missed opportunity Americans ever had to erase the treach­
erous impact of slavery and race in a reconstructed and unified 
nation. There is, in other words, something in Reconstruction for 
nearly every American to regret.1
1
2 RECONSTRUCTION
The term “reconstruction” actually surfaced even before the Civil 
War began in 1861, although in its first form it was a way of describ­
ing how the Constitution would have to be amended in order to 
accommodate the demands of the Southern states and head off their 
secession. “Sooner or later,” predicted New York Democratic finan­
cier August Belmont, there must be “a national convention for the 
reconstruction of one government over all the States.”2 The term 
resurfaced in 1862, this time to describe the pacification policies 
that the federal government might deploy once the Union armies 
had suppressed the Confederate rebellion. Articulating these poli­
cies turned out to be no easy matter. Abraham Lincoln, the president 
whose inauguration had triggered Southern secession in the first 
place, was never at ease using the word “reconstruction”—he qual­
ified it with add-ons like “what is called reconstruction” or “a plan 
of reconstruction (as the phrase goes)”—and preferred to speak of 
the “re-inauguration of the national authority” or the need to “re­
inaugurate loyal state governments.”
But use it Lincoln did, however grudgingly, and he built all of 
his assumptions about the shape of Reconstruction on one sin­
gle presupposition: the constitutional impossibility of secession. 
The Constitution granted no right to the states to secede; ergo, the 
Southern states had never really left the Union, and the so-called 
Confederate States were really only insurrectionary regimes. “I hold, 
that in contemplation of universal law, and of the Constitution, the 
Union of these States is perpetual,” Lincoln said in his first inaugu­
ral address.3 On that basis, he sanctioned the creation of a Unionist 
Virginia government-in-exile and installed temporary “military gov­
ernors” in areas of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas, who 
proposed to carry on the usual functions of state government as 
though secession (and the secessionists) had never existed.
But whatever the legal and constitutional arguments, the 
Confederacy did not look at all like a mere insurrection, like the 
Whiskey Rebellion or the Dorr Rebellion. It comprised eleven 
contiguous states, with a population of more than nine million
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(Belgium, by comparison, had a population of less than five mil­
lion, Scandinavia eighteen million), and it created a new govern­
ment larger than most European nation-states, along with armies to 
defend it. The “leaders of the South have made an army, and they 
have made what is more, they have made a nation/ declared William 
Ewart Gladstone, the United Kingdoms chancellor of the exchequer.
Ironically, Gladstone s view was echoed by several of the most 
fervent members of Lincolns own party, the Republicans. They had 
become known as “radicals” from the outset of the war, and though 
the term described only about half of the Senate s Republicans, and 
slightly more than that in the House of Representatives, they were 
unapologetic in asserting that the Confederate states had lost all title 
to statehood by seceding.
What had really happened when the Southern states seceded, 
Massachusetts senator Charles Sumner countered, was “State sui­
cide or State forfeiture or State abdication.” Whatever the name, 
secession had converted the old Southern states into something less 
than what they had been. What was more, it was the prerogative of 
Congress, not the president, to define that status and create the poli­
cies which control any ideas of reconstructing the Union. Thaddeus 
Stevens, Sumner s counterpart in the House of Representatives, 
wanted to go even further: “We propose to confiscate all the estates 
of every rebel belligerent whose estate was worth $ 10,000, or whose 
land exceeded two hundred acres in quantity.” As for the Confederate 
leadership—and “how many captive enemies it would be proper to 
execute, as an example to nations”—Stevens would bleakly “leave 
others to judge.”4
Lincoln, however, wanted no part of such a draconian recon­
struction. For one thing, it was tantamount to conceding that the 
Confederates had been correct all along in claiming a right to with­
draw from the Union. Lincoln laid out his first detailed strategy for 
“Amnesty and Reconstruction” in December 1863. He proposed to 
grant full pardons “with restoration of all rights of property, except as 
to slaves” to any inhabitants of Southern states reoccupied by federal
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military forces upon taking an oath of future loyalty (and keeping 
“said oath inviolate”). There were several categories of exceptions 
to this opportunity: "civil or diplomatic agents” of the Confederacy 
military and naval officers, and those who had mistreated Union 
prisoners of war. But the purpose behind this apparent generosity 
was really political, because this strategy would grant Lincoln the 
authority to "re-establish a State government” as soon as the oath- 
takers numbered just 10 percent of the 1860 voting population in 
each state—while also ensuring that the "reinaugurated” state gov­
ernments abolished slavery.5
Many Republicans applauded Lincolns plan as "glorious” and 
saw it as an enticement to Southerners not only to end the rebel­
lion but to abandon slavery as well. "The President,” wrote Ohio 
Republican James A. Garfield, "has struck a great blow for the 
country and himself.” But so broad an offer infuriated Stevens and 
Sumner, who interpreted this approach to mean that traitors were 
being invited back into the Union with full privileges and with only 
one significant punishment, and by a president who meant to side­
line Congress in overseeing the process. Opposition to Lincoln s plan 
within Congress (and within Lincolns own party) was spearheaded 
by Ohio Senator Benjamin Wade and Maryland Congressman 
Henry Winter Davis, who designed a Reconstruction plan of their 
own: first, the required number of oath-takers was increased from 
10 to 50 percent; then, a civilian provisional governor would be 
appointed, and the eligible voters would elect a state convention 
to write a new state constitution that would ban slavery and forbid 
rebel officers from serving in the legislature or as governor. Only 
then could these states resume their proper place in the Union and 
send representatives and senators to Congress. "Until majorities 
can be found loyal and trustworthy for state government,” declared 
Wade, the South "must be governed by a stronger hand” than either 
Lincoln or its own repentant Unionists.6
Lincoln scoffed at the Wade-Davis plan, and at the criticisms of 
his own plan, as tantamount to conceding that "states whenever they
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please may of their own motion dissolve their connection with the 
Union/’ the very constitutional issue that began the war. Moreover, 
Reconstruction was an executive branch responsibility, just as man­
aging the war had been; Congress had nothing to do with it, any 
more than it had the authority to trespass on his military author­
ity as commander in chief. (Lincoln said nothing about the role of 
the federal judiciary, which had been mostly silent during the war, 
but the judicial branch would soon seek to join the debate, too). So, 
although Lincoln protested that he was not “inflexibly committed 
to any single plan of restoration,” he pocket-vetoed the Wade-Davis 
plan on July 8, 1864. Congressional Republicans made an effort to 
mollify Lincoln later that year when the House of Representatives’ 
Committee on the Rebellious States (chaired by Henry Winter 
Davis) produced a Reconstruction bill that left open a shared role 
for the president and Congress in the process of Reconstruction. 
But in February 1865, opposition from uncooperative Democrats 
and unappeased Radical Republicans tabled it.7
Not that Lincoln’s own schemes for Reconstructing the 
Confederacy had shone with any success. When Union forces over­
ran eastern North Carolina in the spring of 1862, Lincoln appointed 
Edward Stanly, a North Carolina Unionist, as “military governor” of 
North Carolina, and urged him to arrange the election of a Unionist 
member of Congress in the occupied zone. But Stanly could recruit 
only 864 voters for the election, and the House of Representatives 
refused to seat Stanly’s candidate. Stanly was also at odds with 
Lincoln about the Emancipation Proclamation, and on January 15, 
1863, Stanly resigned. Lincoln did not appoint a successor.
This inauspicious beginning was followed by another failure. 
Union forces recaptured more than half of Arkansas in 1862, and 
on July 19 of that year, Lincoln appointed John S. Phelps as mili­
tary governor. A state constitutional convention met in Little Rock 
in January 1864 and elected Isaac Murphy as provisional gover­
nor. But the two senators and three congressmen they elected were 
also refused seats in Congress. The same pattern, with still more
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embarrassing developments, repeated itself in Louisiana. A military 
governor, George Shepley, was appointed by Lincoln for Louisiana 
after the US Navy captured New Orleans in April, 1862, and Lincoln 
urged him to organize congressional elections without waiting for a 
new state constitution.
The two congressman elected under Shepley s oversight on 
December 3, 1862, managed to persuade Congress to seat them. 
But after a Unionist state convention wrote a free-state constitution 
for Louisiana in 1864, the two senators elected by the Louisiana 
legislature were blocked from their seats by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee "till by some joint action of both Houses there shall be 
some recognition of an existing State government acting in harmony 
with the government of the United States.” One of Lincolns military 
governors, Andrew J. Hamilton, never even set foot in his home state 
of Texas. Only Andrew Johnson, the lone US senator from a seced­
ing state to remain loyal to the Union, enjoyed any kind of success 
after Lincoln appointed him military governor of Tennessee, and 
even then, Johnson did not convene a new state constitutional con­
vention until January 1865. This did not look much like the recon­
struction of anything.8
A second fundamental problem was the future status of the 
freed slaves. Not a single one of the haphazard experiments in 
Reconstruction conducted before the end of the war had specified 
what the future status of the freedpeople would be. Were they now 
supposed to sign contracts and be paid for their labor? Who would 
guarantee that the contracts would not turn out to be simply a newer 
version of bondage? Should provision be made out of the public 
purse to educate them? Should they be considered citizens, and 
entitled to all the "privileges and immunities” guaranteed to citizens 
by Article 4, section 2, of the Constitution? And what were those 
"privileges and immunities” anyway? Office-holding, jury service, 
bearing witness in court, voting, election to office?
One thing was politically certain: on the day slavery was abol­
ished, the Constitutional rules on representation in the House of
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Representatives would undergo a complete change. The so-called 
three-fifths rule in the Constitution (which had prevented slave­
holding states from counting more than three-fifths of their enslaved 
population as part of their total population in order to determine the 
number of representatives each slave state could send to Congress) 
would disappear, and going forward, every freed slave would be 
counted as a full person—yet without any right to vote. It was not 
beyond the realm of possibility that the defeated Southern states 
might send back to a postwar Congress, not only the same num­
ber of representatives they had been able to send before the erup­
tion of war, but an additional thirteen representatives (by Thaddeus 
Stevens’s reckoning) beyond what they had once elected.9 This 
unlooked-for increase in Southern representatives, if it was elected 
only by white Southern votes, would likely be composed entirely 
of old Southern Democrats who would find common cause with 
their old Northern Democratic allies. Together, they could put a 
swift end to the Republicans’ wartime control of Congress and ena­
ble Congress to pass legislation repealing the Republicans’ wartime 
domestic achievements (such as protective tariffs, government assis­
tance to the railroads, the Homestead Act, and the national banking 
system), while burdening the US Treasury with the Confederacy’s 
wartime debts.10 The idea of enfranchising the freed slaves would 
disappear entirely as a political possibility.
For that reason, Charles Sumner made a final desperate attempt 
to assert that "there can be no power under the Constitution to dis­
enfranchise loyal people . . . especially when it may hand over the 
loyal majority to the government of the disloyal minority.” Lincoln 
signaled that he understood this in his last speech, on April 11, 
1865. He simultaneously chided Congress for refusing to admit the 
Louisiana senators, and urged the Louisiana Unionists to recon­
sider granting at least limited black voting rights by "extending the 
vote to the very intelligent, and . . . those who serve our cause as 
soldiers.” They, at least, would be reliable safeguards for "the jewel 
of liberty.” Beyond that, however, beckoned a future he described
8 RECONSTRUCTION
in Richmond on April 4 as one in which free black Americans “shall 
have all the rights which God has given to every other free citizen of 
this republic.” As for the Confederates, he instinctively erred on the 
side of “malice toward none.” He urged his generals to “let them have 
their horses to plow with, and, if you like, their guns to shoot crows 
with.” He “wanted no one punished; treat them liberally all round,” 
which he believed was the only way to get “those people to return 
to their allegiance to the Union and submit to the laws.”11 Whatever 
else might have been contained in that strategy disappeared with 
Lincoln s assassination three days after his last speech.
One of the most-asked questions in American history must 
surely be, what would have happened in the Reconstruction era if 
Lincoln had lived? Lincoln was such a private person, and so tight- 
lipped a politician, that it is impossible to project what further plans 
he would have developed. And, if he had obeyed the unspoken two- 
term rule for occupying the presidency, he would only have been 
in office until March 1869, which is not a substantial period in 
which to effect something as momentous as Reconstruction. Nor 
were there any generally received models to guide Lincoln in such a 
process—or, indeed, anyone else throughout history who had faced 
a similar dilemma. The Roman civil wars divided on postwar policy, 
with Sulla crushing his surviving rivals with an iron fist, but with 
Pompey and Caesar opting for clemency and reconciliation. Henri 
IV brought an end to the strife of the sixteenth-century French Wars 
of Religion because he could advertise himself as an outsider, willing 
to conciliate all parties and eager to bring peace and prosperity to all. 
But across the English Channel, the restored monarchy of Charles 
II abandoned any notion of reconciliation, and hanged, drew, and 
quartered even the corpse of Oliver Cromwell, not to mention his 
living supporters. Closer in time to Reconstruction, the Taiping 
Rebellion in China was suppressed in 1864 in an orgy of massacres. 
Had Reconstruction been planned according to the Sulla, Stuart, or 
Taiping scripts, then proscription, trials, and executions might have 
continued for another generation.
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But instead; American Reconstruction wears the garb of improvi­
sation, uncertainty, and experiment—which historians have difficulty 
containing within narratives that thrive on direction, purpose, and 
determinism. The first non-participant historians of Reconstruction, 
James Ford Rhodes and William Archibald Dunning of Columbia 
University, bore down harshly on Reconstructions missteps, largely 
because both were Democrats politically and had little sympathy for 
a Republican program. Although Rhodes and Dunning professed a 
kind of objective relativism, refusing to offer judgments on the faults 
or virtues of Reconstruction, the faults they found were usually 
with Republicans and the virtues Democratic.12 As a Progressive, 
Dunning (and those who followed in his train: Ulrich B. Phillips, 
J. G. Hamilton, Walter L. Fleming, Charles Ramsdell, and Merton 
Coulter) was suspicious of the follies and inefficiencies of democ­
racy when spread too broadly. In his mind, Reconstruction brought 
not democracy to the South but mob rule and to Washington, noth­
ing but vindictiveness and plunder.13
Criticism of the Dunning School made its first appearance in the 
1930s, beginning with the attacks launched at the Dunningites by 
William Edward Burghardt Du Bois in Black Reconstruction (1935) 
and James S. Allen in Reconstruction: The Battle for Democracy 
(1937). Reconstruction might not have been a proud achievement, 
but, Du Bois objected, Reconstruction led directly "to democratic 
government and the labor movement today.” Allen agreed: "The 
destruction of the slave power was the basis for real national unity 
and the further development of capitalism, which would produce 
conditions most favorable for the growth of the labor movement.”14
Unhappily, neither Du Bois nor Allen possessed a broad plat­
form from which to rally a countermovement, partly because of Du 
Boiss imperious self-isolation and Allens identification with the 
Communist Party. It would not be until the 1960s, after the emer­
gence of the civil rights movement as a "second Reconstruction,” that 
the idols of the Dunning School began to fall. John Hope Franklins 
Reconstruction after the Civil War (1961) and Kenneth Stampps The
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Era of Reconstruction, 1865-77 (1965) started the trend, to be fol­
lowed by John and LaWanda Cox, George Bentley, Richard Current, 
Allen W. Trelease, Herman Belz, and finally by Eric Foner s massive 
Reconstruction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (1988).
Noble as their intentions were, the anti-Dunningites had 
their foibles, too. Du Bois and Allen were both writing from self­
consciously Marxist frameworks that forbade any other understand­
ing of Reconstruction but through class and revolution, with race 
sometimes deployed as a surrogate for class. "The emancipation of 
man is the emancipation of labor/ Du Bois wrote, "and the emanci­
pation of labor is the freeing of that basic majority of workers who are 
yellow, brown and black.” Thus, Reconstruction should have been 
the moment when working-class blacks and whites together had an 
opportunity to create a new American economic and political order, 
only to have it yanked away by a nervous white Northern bourgeoi­
sie who preferred making peace with the defeated Confederates to 
licensing a genuinely radical, biracial workers’ movement.
Reconstruction was, in other words, seen as a typical bourgeois- 
democratic revolution, not unlike the initial phase of the French 
Revolution in 1789 or the liberal democratic revolutions across 
Europe in 1848. Like those uprisings, it pitted a capitalist, middle- 
class bourgeoisie over a slaveholding aristocracy, with the former 
striking up alliances with peasants on the land and workers in 
the tenements to overthrow the rule of the planter elite. This 
newly empowered bourgeoisie derived their authority, first, as the 
Southern Unionist allies of Union military victory, and second as 
the owners of capital and the possessors of professional and com­
mercial income (rather than birthright or status). Alas, bourgeois 
revolutions frighten their own architects, who quickly come to 
see that in encouraging peasants and workers, they have created a 
Frankenstein monster that has no more respect for the bourgeoisie 
than it had for the aristocrats.
At that moment, "the bourgeoisie,” wrote Lenin, "strives to put an 
end to the bourgeois revolution halfway from its destination, when 
freedom has been only half won, by a deal with the old authorities
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and the landlords.” They strive “to reach a tacit pact with the old- 
landed aristocracy in order to preserve their power.”15 But the genie 
cannot be stuffed back into the bottle; it is only stunned; and in time 
it will reawaken with renewed strength as the guide and leader of the 
socialist revolution; and finish off industrial capitalism; just as the 
bourgeoisie finished off the aristocrats. Du Bois in particular bears 
the impress of this notion of Reconstruction as a bourgeois revolu­
tion; for in Du Boiss telling; Reconstructions “vision of democracy 
across racial lines” was undone by a “counterrevolution of property.”
The principal difficulty with such a conventional Marxist narra­
tive is that neither the Civil War nor Reconstruction fit neatly into 
it. Both the Civil War and Reconstruction belong to a chapter in 
American history in which the United States was still an overwhelm­
ingly agricultural economy and the contest that was waged between 
1861 and 1865 was largely an argument (in economic terms) between 
the free-labor family farm and the slave-labor cotton plantation.16
Nor is there any evidence that the victorious Republicans who 
attempted to build a bourgeois South among the ruins of the old 
plantation order ever panicked at the prospect of empowering blacks 
or poor whites; or betrayed them by establishing a self-protecting 
alliance with the dethroned aristocrats. And the freedpeople hardly 
experienced a taste of Marxist alienation; they instead experienced 
bourgeois frustration at their exclusion from material accumulation 
and democratic and judicial process, and that was how they articu­
lated it. If Reconstruction was indeed a bourgeois revolution, it was 
a pure bourgeois revolution—a self-contained revolutionary event 
outside the boundaries of Marxist theory. And if it failed, it was not 
because it sold out, but because it was overthrown by the resurgent 
political power of a bloodied but unbowed aristocracy.
It was also easy, in the midst of so many shortcomings and fail­
ures in Reconstruction, for the anti-Dunningites to overlook four 
important ways in which Reconstruction actually succeeded:
• Reconstruction restored a federal Union, for which the 
North had been fighting from the start, and corrected the
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centrifugal forces of the American federal Union that had 
brought on the war in the first place.
• Reconstruction followed the route of generosity—it 
created no conquered provinces, no mass executions 
for treason. As Walt Whitman wrote, almost in self- 
congratulation, Reconstruction “has been paralleled 
nowhere in the world—in any other country on the globe 
the whole batch of the Confederate leaders would have had 
their heads cut off.” Ironically, most of the violence that 
pockmarked Reconstruction was inflicted on the victors, 
not the vanquished.17
• The freedpeople made only modest economic gains in 
moving out of the shadow of slavery into freedom and 
self-ownership. But there were still beachheads for black 
Southerners all across the South in terms of property 
ownership and embourgeoisment, which would form the 
soil out of which the civil rights movement would flourish 
eighty years later.
• In the same fashion, Reconstruction established, beyond a 
doubt, the legal equality of all Americans under the banner 
of citizenship. Much of that equality was compromised 
by racial prejudice, vigilante violence, and the twisting of 
law. But it was not extinguished, and the Reconstruction- 
era amendments to the Constitution (the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth) have together formed the last 
on which injustice, racial prejudice, and inequality have 
repeatedly been hammered down.
Not everything that should have been gained was gained in 
Reconstruction; but not everything was lost, either.
Historical writing on Reconstruction has expanded exponentially 
since the 1960s, pushing the boundaries of Reconstruction histori­
ography into new subfields of time, labor, geography, gender, family, 
and economics. The American West has increasingly become part of
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the Reconstruction schema, starting with the military subjugation 
of the Plains Indian tribes, but increasingly reaching to include the 
challenge posed to an American Protestant culture by the Mormon 
colony of Utah and the racial triangle formed by Cherokee slavery 
and segregation.18 There is now a greater sense of the continuity of 
Reconstruction backward to the war years (as in, for example, con­
necting the activities of Civil War guerrillas with the postwar insur­
gency of the Ku Klux Kian) and forward to the civil rights movement 
of the 1960s. Studies of the experience of veterans, both Northern 
and Southern, in Reconstruction have only just begun to come to the 
fore, as have also inquiries into how, with a certain postmodern twist, 
Reconstruction influenced the memory of the Civil War and, in addi­
tion, generated its own historical memory. Even the conventional 
chronology of Reconstruction has been reworked, so that in some 
cases the starting point has been pushed back well into the Civil War 
years, and in others substantially far forward, to the beginning of Jim 
Crow segregation in the 1890s. For the purposes here, it will be easi­
est if Reconstruction is thought of as four discrete movements:
• Early Reconstruction, from the first of Lincolns experiments 
in 1862 until the announcement of Andrew Johnsons 
appointment of provisional governors for the Southern 
states in 1865;
• Presidential (or executive) Reconstruction, covering the 
short-lived Johnson governments, from mid-1865 to the 
passage of the Congressional Reconstruction Acts in 1867, 
which attempted to curtail the liberties of the freed slaves 
and return ex-Confederates to Washington as members of 
Congress;
• Congressional Reconstruction, which begins with the 
Reconstruction Acts and concludes with the readmission, 
under the terms of those statutes, of the last of the one­
time Confederate states to representation in Congress in 
1870, during which time the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
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Amendments to the Constitution empowered the 
emergence of a black political leadership class; and
• Overthrow of Reconstruction, from 1870, when the first 
white Democratic regimes were elected to “redeem” the 
southern states from Republican control, until 1877, 
when the last Southern Republican governments, in South 
Carolina and Louisiana, were extinguished.
One may also speak of an “Aftermath” of Reconstruction, from 
1877 until 1896, to include the increasingly oppressive nature of the 
“Redeemer” regimes, the capture of both houses of Congress and 
the executive branch by Democrats in 1893, and the disastrous deci­
sion in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson to give federal countenance to 
racial segregation. Some of these categories are porous; Virginia, for 
instance, was readmitted under the Reconstruction Acts in 1870, 
but had already returned the Democratic party to effective power 
four months before, only to witness the rise of a “Readjuster” move­
ment in the 1880s which fused black Republicans and moderate 
Democrats; and Tennessee was never included in the Reconstruction 
Acts and was readmitted to Congress in 1866—but they will serve 
as a general timeline.
Awareness of the increasing varieties of Reconstruction inter­
pretation will not prevent Reconstruction: A Concise History from 
committing some offenses, mostly in the interest of remaining 
short. Extensive explorations of gender, family, veterans, philos­
ophy, literature—all of them, unhappily, are beyond the scope of 
a series whose volumes, to be fair, are intended to each offer but 
a brief introduction to the topic at hand. This small offering will 
attempt no more than to fashion a basic scaffolding for understand­
ing Reconstruction, leaving the vaster structures of elaboration and 
interpretation to improvised ad libitum.
